Introduction
The number of resource rich countries has grown rapidly. Countries rich in resources may suffer from the "resource curse", and develop at a slower pace than those without such resources (Auty 1993, Sachs and Warner 2001) . Policy options for governments to avoid the resource curse are critical.
Recently, the direct distribution of natural resource wealth through cash transfers has been recommended as one way to avoid the resource curse. By removing resources from the hands of government and putting them in the hands of the people, incentives to undermine institutions will be removed, accountability and transparency will grow, and the benefits of natural resources will be more equitably shared. Or so the arguments run.
But what about the actual experience with so-called "resources-to-cash" transfers?
There is virtually no literature on such transfers in developing countries. This paper tells the story of Mongolia's experience with its resources-to-cash transfers.
Mongolia is perhaps the only developing country that has actually introduced a resources-to-cash scheme. Yet its experience has been little studied. By summarising and assessing Mongolia's experience, this study aims to fill that gap.
Section 2 provides a brief overview of the relevant literature on the resource curse and resources-to-cash. Section 3 gives an introduction to Mongolia, and Section 4 describes its experiments with resources-to-cash. Section 5 analyses whether Mongolia introduced a resources-to-cash scheme (yes), and whether it should be regarded as a success (no). Section 6 discusses the lessons from Mongolia and concludes.
Resources-to-cash
When possession of natural resources confers automatic wealth, those with access to the resources, government officials or elites, are more likely to engage in rent seeking and corrupt behavior, preventing or undermining the emergence of democratic institutions that promote accountability and transparency (Liete and Weidmann 1999 , Aslaksen 2007 , Petermmann, Guzma and Tilton 2007 , Collier and Venables 2009 .
Further, since having resource wealth removes the need for a government to collect tax from the general public, citizens may feel less empowered to demand provision of public goods and services or demand that public funds are spent in an efficient way (Devarajan, Le and Raballan 2010, Robinson, Torvik and Verdier 2006) . Hence, the resource curse.
The direct distribution of resources has been proposed by various authors as a way to avoid the resource curse. At its core, resources-to-cash involves the transfer of natural resource rents to citizens through cash transfers. This is argued to have a number of benefits (Moss 2011) . First, by removing natural resource wealth from the hands of government, the incentives for rent seeking would also be removed. Second, citizens would have additional incentives to monitor government behaviour because of their direct stake in resource revenues. Third, lacking resource rents, governments would have to generate revenue in large part through income taxes, establishing accountability for the state as a provider in return for taxpayer money. Fourth, cash transfers would ensure a better distribution of natural resource wealth among citizens. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) and Birdsall (2004) were the first to propose the direct distribution of resource revenues to citizens. Devarajan, Le and Raballand (2010) advocated for the introduction of this type of scheme in some of Africa's new oil producing countries. The Centre for Global Development has been championing the initiative since 2010 with an ongoing series of working papers 1 and most recently published a book on the subject (Moss, Lambert and Majerowicz 2015) . Other authors to endorse the proposal include Segal (2010) , Diamond and Mosbacher (2013) , and Donald Kaberuka, the President of the African Development Bank (AfDB). 2 1 For all of the Centre for Global Development's working papers on Oil to Cash, see www.cgdev.org/initiative/oil-cash-fighting-resource-curse-through-cash-transfers. 2 Kaberuka endorsed distributing about 10-20 percent of oil revenues in cash at a forum in Addis Ababa in November 2014.
A few critics have spoken out against the proposal. Gupta, Segura-Ubiergo and Flores (2014) are sceptical because the hypothesis that transfers would change state incentives and institutions remains untested. Gillies (2010) cautions that the anticipated benefits of direct distribution rests on many assumptions that probably do not hold in the developing contexts for which the policy is targeted.
But what about the evidence? The most often cited case of success is Alaska. In 1980, the citizens of Alaska voted to amend the state constitution to establish the Alaska Permanent Fund, and since then a portion of realised profits from oil revenue investments has been distributed to all qualified citizens. 3 However, the size of these transfers is modest compared to actual oil earnings. Cash transfers are not taxed back by the Alaskan government. Significantly, at the time of oil discovery, Alaska was already a developed state with a strong institutional setting.
Iran has had an unconditional cash transfer program since 2011, funded by for the withdrawal of fuel subsidies (Tabatabai 2012) . Bolivia, Timor Leste and Venezuela are all resource-rich countries with social protection programs.
In none of these developing countries has there been a stated link between cash transfers and natural resource rents. Mongolia attempted to put in place such a link.
Indeed, as far as we are aware, it is the only developing country that has actually implemented a resources-to-cash model. However, Mongolia's experience has been little studied. While there are some analyses of its transfer schemes (Budragchaa et al 2007, Gankhuyag and Banzarch 2014) none approach the issue explicitly from the angle of what it has to say about resources-to-cash. The recent book by Moss, Lambert and Majerowicz (2015) gives a short and open-ended summary of Mongolia's experience with its cash transfers, refraining from making any overall assessment, saying only that the success of its scheme "remains to be seen" and that the program is "half-way there".
Mongolia
Mongolia is a landlocked country in east-central Asia, bordered by Russia to the north and China to the south. With a population of 2.8 million people and a landmass of 1.6 million square kilometres, it is the least densely populated country in the world. Less than one percent of the landmass is arable, and the country has extreme climate patterns that see winters regularly reach minus 40 degrees Celsius. Traditionally, most of Mongolia's population has been agrarian and nomadic or semi-nomadic, but in recent years Mongolia has become increasingly urbanised, with 60 percent of the population now living in the capital, Ulaanbaatar.
Mongolia was under foreign rule for centuries and one of the earliest countries to embrace communism in 1921. The country has undergone a rapid transition since 1990; the fall of the Soviet bloc ushered in an era of political and economic changes. Mining is very important to Mongolia. Past Soviet support enabled the initial discovery of significant deposits of coal, copper and gold in the 1970s and the development of several state owned mines. The economic recession during the transition and low commodity prices in the early 1990s saw the mining industry stagnate. This was until the mid-1990s when, in line with other economic liberalisation measures, attractive foreign investment arrangements were put in place to revive the mining sector (Gankhuyag and Banzragch 2014) .
In large part due to the rapid rise of copper and gold prices (see Figure 1 Simultaneously, concerns about the lack of shared benefits, environmental degradation and the perceived unchecked, rapid expansion of mining became increasingly common among the populace and government policies responded with a nationalist turn. In 2010 and 2011, exploration licenses stopped being issued and an international bid to develop Tavan Tolgoi, a major coal deposit, was cancelled. Development of Oyu Tolgoi, the largest copper-gold deposit projected to account for a third of Mongolia's GDP when at full production, was stalled for two years as the government attempted to renegotiate the contract for a bigger share of ownership. These events led to a marked decline in capital investment and corresponding shrinkage in mining output and growth.
In recent years, Mongolia has struggled to maintain the strength of its institutions and avoid corruption. In a 2011 study, Mongolia ranked amongst the highest of non-fuel economies in terms of vulnerability to the resource curse, based on its mineral dependence and economic and institutional development (Haglund 2011) . (EITI), and made significant improvements in its Open Budget Index. Whether these measures can make a real difference remains to be seen, but they may explain these recent improvements in accountability scores.
Resources-to-cash in Mongolia
As summarised by Figure 5, Mongolia's experiment with resources-to-cash has been through several phases. Annex A has a more detailed summary, and the text below tells the story. The lengthy administrative process was problematic. It was Mongolia's first use of proxy means testing methods and high inclusion and exclusion rates hampered the credibility of the system (Fritz, Finch and Byambatsogt, 2008) . In addition, the time taken to travel to district centres to submit applications and collect benefits often deterred the most vulnerable from accessing the system. Many did not have all the required paperwork and costs to have copies reissued were prohibitive.
Due to these problems and other public complaints, from July 2005, the requirement that eligible households had to have at least three children was dropped. Other conditions for eligibility were retained.
Universal Child Money Program: July 2006 to December 2009
In and to enter into a heavily discounted forward contract with its trading partner, Chalco (Infomongolia 2015) .
Recognising how costly the program had become, the Election Law was amended in December 2011 to prevent mineral funded cash transfers from becoming a campaign issue again. Both major parties signed agreements to reinforce the ruling.
7 It was agreed that 500,000MNT would be distributed in cash and 1 million MNT in in-kind benefits to fulfill the 1.5 million MNT commitment by 2012. In-kind benefits included tuition fees for students, pensions for the disabled or retired and deposits for housing purchases.
In early 
Analysis Did Mongolia introduce a resources-to-cash scheme?
If we are to draw lessons from Mongolia's experience, we need first to decide whether it actually introduced a resources-to-cash program. We argue it did, beginning in 2006 with the MDF universal child payments, followed by the 2010 to 2012 universal payments, paid from the HDF.
Mongolia's scheme departed from the resources-to-cash ideal in several respects. In particular, the link in practice, as against in intent, to resource revenues, was weak.
Payments were based on election promises rather than an assessment of what revenues actually were at the time of the distribution. This meant that, as Figure 6 shows, at some points, cash transfers actually exceeded mineral revenue, and the HDF had to be topped up by borrowing. In 2010, when the universal transfers began, total cash transfers amounted to 324 billion MNT, more than treble the amount distributed in the previous year and almost twice the amount of HDF revenue from dividends, taxes and royalties collected from mining operations. In 2011, when regular monthly transfers began, annual HDF expenditures more than doubled again to almost 800 million MNT, while HDF revenue from dividends and taxes stood at 300 million MNT ( Figure 6 ). In both years, the gap had to be met by borrowing.
Figure 6: Human Development Fund revenue and expenditure

Source and notes: Budget implementation reports of the Government of Mongolia, www.itlod.gov.mn. The bars show HDF revenue and its components.
Another departure from the ideal is that Mongolia's cash transfers have never been taxable. According to Moss et al (2015) , minerals-to-cash cash transfers should be universal, from resource revenue, and taxed. Since one of the aims of resources-to-cash is to increase the state's reliance on taxation of its citizenry, Mongolia's failure to tax its transfers is an important shortcoming. However, resources-to-cash schemes should not be defined so narrowly that only extremely well designed schemes can qualify as such. Such an approach might lead to the conclusions that there are in fact no such schemes anywhere in the world. Note that Alaska's direct transfers are also non-taxable (by Alaska). A broader definition, such as the one we use -cash transfers explicitly based on resource revenues -seems more helpful.
Does Mongolia still have a resources-to-cash scheme in place? This is less clear, but a scheme which provides funds for every child (rather than every person) could still be counted as such as a resources-to-cash scheme (Moss et al p. 66) . Importantly, however, Mongolia is planning to break the link between resource revenues and the transfers, as its new draft sovereign wealth legislation will abolish the HDF. The new sovereign wealth fund, the FHF, will not be used to finance cash transfers (or any other specific expenditures for that matter). If that happens, then, even if the child payments are retained, the link between resource revenues and payments will be severed.
In summary, momentum has swung away from Mongolia's resources-to-cash scheme. It has become less universal, and the link to resource revenues is planned be terminated.
Did it work?
Earlier analysis by UNICEF estimated the extent to which the conditional Child Money
Program ( and D for details). Using the same methods as the earlier studies (that is, assuming that the cash transfer was fully consumed and had no labour supply effects), we find that poverty was significantly lower because of the Human Development Fund than it would have been otherwise. Depending on the year and which poverty line is used, the transfer reduced poverty by as little as 10 percent or as much as one-third (see Tables 1 and 2 ). Tables 3 and 4 estimate the impact of the universal transfers on inequality, using the Gini coefficient and the Palma ratio (the ratio of the income share of the top 10% to the bottom 40%). In all years, the HDF transfers reduced inequality; for example by 7.6 percent (35.02 percent to 32.27 percent) in 2010 when measured by the Gini coefficient, or 12.8 percent (1.48 to 1.29) when measured by the Palma ratio. The transfers reduced poverty and inequality because of their progressive nature. Figure 6 shows the proportion of the benefit compared to pre-benefit consumption, which fluctuated due to the size of the annual benefit amount. In 2011, for example, when the benefit was at its highest, the transfer amounted to 70% of pre-benefit consumption expenditure for those in the bottom decile, compared to only 5% for individuals in the top decile. The most important claimed benefit for resources-to-cash is that it enhances accountability. This is a benefit that would likely take decades to materialise, and which we are therefore unlikely to see in Mongolia due to the loss of support for the scheme.
Note also that in Mongolia neither the accountability mechanism based on increased taxation nor that based on the link between resource performance and benefit could have been effective since transfers were neither taxed nor linked in practice to the size of revenue.
Demands for accountability were shown, however, as protests broke out whenever there was a delay in distribution of the HDF payments, and major protests in April 2010
were successful in forcing the government to commit to a payment timetable. This suggests that citizens are more likely to be politically active and hold government to account when they are expecting a dividend.
In summary, Mongolia's resources-to-cash scheme had a positive impact on poverty and inequality, a negative macroeconomic impact, and possibly a small positive impact on accountability.
None of these impacts will likely last, however, as Mongolia's resources-to-cash has lost political and public support, and is likely to be discontinued. "direct disbursement" reached the peak of its popularity during the financial crisis and when the idea was first publicised. Since then, it has largely experienced a downward trend and its popularity has halved from about 20 percent to about 10 percent. Even at the height of its popularity, direct disbursement has received much less support than the use of funds for either "invested by state" or for "long term social development", and these gaps have widened over time. The latter two options are now about four times as popular as direct disbursement. For the poorest families, the HDF became a significant, if not the main source of income. 
Direct disbursement
Invested by state They said they spent the income entirely on food, clothing and household goods. In contrast, other groups said it made little difference to their lifestyles. Some wealthier individuals said that they did not even collect their benefits from the assigned bank account, as it simply wasn't worth it.
It should be noted from the public opinion surveys that "direct disbursements" and "immediate relief to the poor" are now equally unpopular options (Figure 9 ). The general population would much rather see investments in physical or human capital than either universal or targeted transfers.
Many interviewees felt the cash transfers were not affordable. One academic said:
"People knew it wasn't a good policy, because, where was the money coming from?
Everyone knew the economy was in trouble but still the government kept giving money." And, as reflected in the Sant Maral surveys, many focus group participants said they would have preferred that the funds were spent on "investments in the future", such as building school kindergartens or creating more jobs.
Third, there was a view among academic and technocratic interviewees that the process represented an abuse of the political process. It was said during interviews that the policy was always "purely political", and "an abuse of the savings fund." This sentiment is reflected in the amendment of the Election Law and agreement by the two major parties to stop competing on the basis of cash payments.
Fourth, there was a view both in the interviews and in the focus group sessions that the cash handouts disincentivised school leavers and first-time job seekers to look for work as they were regularly receiving "free money".
Lastly, in every interview conducted, it was reported that some citizens would spend the entire monthly cash transfer on alcohol. One said "on the day of the month when cash was given, you could see people coming out of the bank and walking straight to the alcohol store." A Bloomberg article (Humber 2013 ) echoed this claim, claiming "[the] government sends cash handouts, which has only encouraged more bars and karaoke parlours". More research would be needed to substantiate either of the above two claims.
Our main finding is that design and implementation flaws undermined the sustainability and therefore any lasting impact of Mongolia's resources-to-cash scheme. It is not entirely a negative story. There was political learning in the form of an agreement between parties not to compete on the size of the transfers. The scheme was progressive and reduced poverty and inequality. But it also increased debt and possibly inflation. More problematically, Mongolia's resources-to-cash experiment came to be seen as wasteful and irresponsible. It lost political and public support. As a result, the universality of the scheme was watered down, and there is now a commitment to do away with the link between resource revenues and transfers by abolishing the HDF. It is too early to write off resources-to-cash in Mongolia (there might always be a recovery of support), but at this stage it certainly appears to have been a failure. Moss et al. (2015, p. 144) write that the Mongolia experience "demonstrates the potential popularity of Oil-to-Cash and its political feasibility under a competitive electoral system". While this is a fair reading of the 2008 elections, one might also say that subsequent experience demonstrates the ultimate political unpopularity and unfeasibility of resources-to-cash. Such a conclusion would be too strong, but
Discussion and conclusion
Mongolia's experience certainly points to the risk of support for resources-to-cash being undermined by poor design and implementation. In Mongolia, it would seem that there was always a certain scepticism regarding universal transfers, and that the experience of the scheme heightened that scepticism.
Our findings provide backing for Gillies (2010 p16), who writes: "policy mechanisms tend to reflect the environment from which they emerge. Direct distribution [resourcesto-cash] may offer the greatest expenditure efficiency gains in countries where governments fail in providing public goods[;] however, its implementation will be the most difficult in these same contexts"(p.15). As a young democracy, Mongolia has fledging, weak institutions and a political environment prone to short-term decisionmaking. These weaknesses pervaded and undermined, probably fatally, many aspects of its resources-to-cash scheme.
We are particularly sceptical of the idea that resources-to-cash schemes will strengthen accountability by enhancing taxation. We are only aware of two resource-to-cash schemes: Alaska's and Mongolia's. In neither are the transfers taxed, nor have their tax regimes changed as a result of introducing the payments. In any case, in developing countries, systems of direct taxation are very weak, and typically applicable only to the formal sector. Even if transfers were taxable, most recipients would not pay that tax.
Various mechanisms have been put forward to solve the resources curse: investment in infrastructure and human capital; sovereign wealth funds; and now, resources-to-cash.
If implemented well, these mechanisms should all help avoid the resources curse. But there is no reason to think it is easier to implement oil-to-cash than the other proposed mechanisms. Perhaps it is easier to give away cash than to build infrastructure, but, as
Mongolia shows, the very ease of handing money out also makes it easier for this option to blow the budget.
Overall, Mongolia is a cautionary tale. One should certainly not dismiss the potential benefits of resources-to-cash on the basis of one, poorly designed and implemented instance. Rather the lesson of the Mongolia experience is that resources-to-cash needs to take its place alongside, rather than be favoured over, other policy instruments that have been recommended for resource-dependent economies. 
Annex B: Mongolian consultations Interviews
Interviews were arranged with government, civil society organisations and academia to understand how the cash transfer system began and evolved, views on its impact and future direction.
Interviews were conducted in English and recorded with the participant's permission. 
Focus group sessions
Focus group sessions were arranged with citizens to garner beneficiary views on cash transfers. Two focus group locations were chosen to capture differences in urban and rural citizen views. Within each locale, groups were divided into civil servants, unemployed, and social welfare dependents to capture the potential range of opinions given different income levels.
The Centre for Social Work Excellence assisted in arranging the groups by firstly contacting the local governors to seek permission for the activity and secondly asked the local social worker to contact those available on the specified day to attend the focus group sessions hosted at the governor's office. Social workers were each given 20,000
MNT mobile phone vouchers as a token of appreciation, and focus group members were provided with chocolates and tea during the session.
Focus groups were held in Mongolian and recorded for translation and reference with the participants' permission. Each focus group started with an introduction on the research topic followed by a set of questions. The facilitator translated the responses into written English responses following the sessions.
Location Participants Date
Khoroo #5,
Ulaanbaatar
Civil Servants (3) Unemployed (8) Social welfare dependents (14) 22/9/2014
Tov aimag
Civil Servants (7) Livestock herders (6) Unemployed (4) 25/9/2014
Annex C: Methodology of poverty and inequality estimates
Prior to this study, no estimation of the impact of the cash transfers via the Human Development Fund (HDF) on poverty and inequality had been attempted. This section details this paper's methodology to estimate the impacts of the HDF.
Poverty
Poverty is typically measured by calculating the percentage of the population that fall below the poverty line, a minimum level of income for basic living in a particular setting. This is calculated on from household survey data which is collected.
In Mongolia, the poverty line is based on a minimum subsistence basket of food and non-food items calculated for each region. 10 As regional poverty lines did not aggregate to national poverty data, two national poverty lines were constructed to form the lower and upper poverty lines. Given the absence of a definite poverty line, poverty dominance techniques were used to generate poverty headcount rates (discussed below). 11
Poverty line construction
Poverty rates can be calculated by drawing a poverty line through a given consumption profile. As there was no national poverty line and only national consumption data, upper and lower poverty lines were constructed.
Two approaches were taken:
10 The country is divided into five regions; Central, Eastern, Western, Khangai and Ulaanbaatar.
11 http://www.fao.org/docs/up/easypol/431/povetyanddominance_035en.pdf 
Inequality
Gini coefficient
The Gini coefficient is the most commonly used measure of inequality. It measures the distribution of incomes for a given population, and represented by a number between 0 and 1, where 0 represents perfect equality and 1 corresponds with perfect inequality.
The formula for the gini coefficient is:
We used the average decile consumption data for income and population, where n is the decile number, and y, the average income for the corresponding decile.
Palma Ratio
To measure inequality at the extremes, the Palma index measures the ratio of the income of richest 10 percent divided by the income of the poorest 40 per cent. This was a simple exercise as consumption data was grouped by decile. 
